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0.	  Introduction†	  	  
What	  does	  determine	  social	  behaviour?	  Do	  we	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  act	  independently	  
of	  social	   influences	  or	  does	  our	  sociocultural	   setting	  drive	  our	  actions?	   In	   this	  paper	   I	  
present	  a	  philosophical	  argument	  relative	  to	  the	  ‘Structure	  vs.	  Agency’	  debate	  (S	  vs.	  A).	  
The	   S	   vs.	   A	   debate	   concerns	   the	   primacy	   of	   structure	   or	   agency	   as	   the	   main	  
determinants	   of	   human	   behavior	   and	   is	   one	   of	   the	   most	   central	   debates	   in	   social	  
sciences	   (SoSci)	   (e.g.	  O’	  Donnell,	  2010;	  Barker,	  2005)	   to	   the	  extent	   that	   it	   cuts	  across	  
many	   of	   the	   most	   fundamental	   aspects	   of	   human	   cultural	   life.	   Most	   importantly,	   it	  
points	  to	  a	  deep	  contradiction	  in	  human	  nature.	  Namely,	  the	  conundrum	  is	  that	  while	  
structure	  is	  necessary	  for	  social	  life,	  for	  instance	  conventions	  like	  driving	  on	  the	  left	  side	  
of	  the	  road	  while	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  are	  crucial	  for	  commuting	  safely,	  at	  the	  same	  
time	  it	  constrains	  us	  from	  doing	  what	  we	  would	  like	  to	  do,	  e.g.	  driving	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  
the	   road	   to	   use	   a	   caricature	   of	   the	   previous	   example.	   In	   this	   sense,	   structure	   is	  
necessary	  and	  fundamental	  yet	  restrictive.	  A	  further	  characteristic	  of	  structure(s)	  is	  that	  
it/(they)	  appear	  to	  us	  as	  being	  natural	  even	  though	  it	  sis/(they	  are)	  actually	  artificial	  or	  
conventional.	   Consider	   for	   instance	   that	   for	  many	   the	  ways	   in	   which	   young	   children	  
behave	   is	   natural	   even	   though	   there	   are	   significant	   differences	   in	   the	   way	   children	  
behave	  within	  different	  cultural	  contexts	  in	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  	  	  
Clearly	  both	  Agency	  and	  Structure	  are	  crucial	   in	  shaping	  social	  behavior.	  For	   instance,	  
Berger	   and	   Luckmann	   (1966)	   construe	   the	   relation	   between	   the	   two	   as	   dialectic	   in	  
nature.	   	  As	  already	  mentioned,	  what	   is	  crucial	   is	   that	  the	  S	  vs.	  A	  debate	  concerns	  the	  
primacy	   of	   one	   or	   the	   other.	   For	   instance,	   Structuralists,	   (e.g.	   Lévi-­‐Strauss),	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Functionalists,	  (e.g.	  Comte,	  Spencer	  and	  Parsons),	  Marxists,	  (Althusser)	  and	  so	  forth	  opt	  
for	   the	   primacy	   of	   structure	   over	   agency.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Methodological	  
Individualists	   (e.g.	   Weber)	   who	   roughly	   argue	   that	   social	   agents	   act	   upon	   rational	  
choices;	   Interactionsists	  (e.g.	  Mead;	  Blumer)	  –	  those	  arguing	  for	  the	  subjective	  nature	  
of	  social	  reality	  and	  that	  social	  processes	  reduce	  to	  interaction	  of	   individuals	  –	  and	  so	  
forth,	  argue	  for	  the	  primacy	  of	  Agency.1	  Crucially,	  answering	  the	  central	  question	  in	  the	  
S	   vs.	   A	   debate	   differently	  most	   often	   correlates	  with	   different	   approaches	   to	   several	  
other	   central	   issues	   in	   SoSci.	   For	   instance,	   issues	   concerning	   social	   ontology	   and	   the	  
nature	  of	  the	  social	  realm;	  what	  qualifies	  as	  a	  cause	  and	  what	  as	  an	  effect	  in	  the	  social	  
world,	  and	  so	  forth.	  	  
In	   this	   paper,	  my	   task	   is	   not	   to	   argue	   for	   the	   primacy	   of	   either	   Agency	   or	   Structure.	  
Instead,	  I	  am	  suggesting	  an	  empirically	  supported	  view	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  thinking	  and	  
use	  this	  view	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  Agency	  as	  used	  by	  social	  scientists	  (SoScis)	  
and	   in	   turn	   on	   the	   Structure	   Vs.	   Agency	   debate.	  My	   argument	   is	   that	   in	   light	   of	   the	  
suggestions	  made	  here	  about	  the	  notion	  of	  agency	  the	  S	  vs.	  A	  debate	  is	  rendered	  rather	  
redundant.	   In	   a	   certain	   sense,	   this	   claim	   resonates	   Parson’s	   (1937)	   claim	   that	   this	  
debate	  is	  a	  pseudo-­‐debate.2	  	  
Focusing	  on	  the	  specifics	  of	  the	  debate,	  Agency	  refers	  to	  individuals	  and	  particularly	  to	  
the	  capacities	  of	  individuals	  to	  act	  as	  agents	  on	  their	  own	  behalf;	  to	  exercise	  their	  free	  
will	  and	  engage	   in	   instrumental	  action	  both	  as	   individuals	  and	  as	  part	  of	   larger	   social	  
groups.	  Furthermore,	  Agency	  might	   refer	   to	   the	  capacity	  of	   individuals	   to	  consciously	  
and	  willfully	   change	   their	   surrounding	   environment;	  make	   choices	   in	   society	   that	   are	  
not	  guided	  by	  anything	  else	  other	  than	  their	  own	  desires,	  goals,	  agendas	  and	  wishes.	  	  In	  
this	  sense,	  what	  is	  crucial	  here	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  individual	  choice	  and	  our	  capacity	  to	  act	  
at	  will	  and	  independently	  of	  social	  pressures	  and	  influences.	  Briefly	  put,	  it	  refers	  to	  our	  
capacity	  to	  make	  our	  own	  free	  choices.	  Clearly,	  the	  notion	  of	  Agency	  is	  closely	  related	  
to	  the	  notion	  of	  Free	  Will.	  Despite	  their	  close	  connection	  though,	  I	  do	  not	  examine	  here	  
the	  implications	  that	  the	  present	  analysis	  of	  Agency	  has	  for	  the	  Free	  Will	  debate.	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Structure	  refers	  to	  the	  social	  structures	  and	  arrangements	  that	  are	  
believed	   to	   constrain,	   or	   in	   any	   case	   influence,	   choices	   of	   individuals.	   In	   this	   sense,	  
structure	  is	  what	  constrains	  us	  from	  acting	  as	  autonomous	  agents,	  and	  refers	  to	  either	  
material	  or	  cultural	  factors.	  Structure	  often	  refers	  to	  the	  process	  of	  socialisation,	  i.e.	  the	  
process	   of	   internalising	   existing	   social	   norms,	   principles,	   inferential	   patterns	   and	   so	  
forth	   (Berger	   and	   Luckmann,	   1966;	   Searle	   1995;	   Clausen,	   1968).	   The	   factors	   that	  
constrain	  us	  from	  acting	  upon	  our	  will	  include	  social	  class;	  education;	  religion;	  gender;	  
customs	   and	   so	   forth.	   Furthermore,	   this	   list	   of	   factors	   that	   restrain	   us	   from	  willfully	  
pursue	   our	   agendas	   also	   includes	   biological	   and	   genetic	   factors,	   on	   which	   I	   am	   not	  
directly	  focusing	  here	  though.	  	  
Despite	   being	   external	   to	   the	   individual	   agent,	   most,	   if	   not	   all,	   sociologists	   would	  
emphatically	  argue	  that	  structure	  does	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  decisions	  that	  we	  make.	  
Consider	   for	   instance	   feudal	   societies.	  On	   top	  of	   the	   feudal	  pyramid	  of	  power,	  a	  king	  
grants	   permission	   to	   the	   nobles	   to	   use	   parts	   of	   the	   land	   in	   exchange	   of	  money	   and	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knights.	  In	  turn,	  the	  nobles	  bestow	  an	  analogous	  right	  (fief)	  to	  the	  social	  class	  of	  knights	  
in	   exchange	   of	   protection	   and	   military	   services.	   Finally,	   knights	   bestow	   land	   and	  
protection	   to	   the	   peasants	   who	   in	   turn	   provide	   food	   and	   services	   to	   the	   knights.	  
Contrast	   that	  now	  with	  modern	   capitalist	   societies	   in	  which	   there	   is	   significant	   social	  
mobility	   and	  where	   individuals	   provide	   products	   and	   services	   independently	   of	   their	  
social	   class	  but	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  market’s	  demands	  and	   the	   levels	  of	   supply.	  Clearly,	  
structure	  is	  very	  different	  in	  these	  two	  cases.	  However,	  it	  is	  similar	  in	  that	  in	  both	  cases	  
structure	   is	   external	   to	   the	   individual	   and	   most	   crucially	   it	   literally	   defines	   several	  
important	  aspects	  of	  our	  sociocultural	  lives.	  For	  instance,	  structure	  defines	  the	  ways,	  in	  
which	  products	  are	  produced,	  distributed	  and	  consumed.	  	  
In	  this	  sense,	  structure	  plays	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  shaping	  cultural	  life	  and	  in	  turn	  the	  S	  vs.	  A	  
debate	  relates	  closely	  to	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  topics.	   In	  an	  attempt	  to	  focus	  the	  discussion	  
and	  my	  agenda	  in	  this	  paper,	  I	  am	  focusing	  mainly	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  Agency	  
is	   strongly	   related	   to	   higher	   cognitive	   processing	   such	   as	   conscious	   thinking	   and	  
decision-­‐making.	  Given	   that	   the	  aspects	  of	  human	  behaviour	   that	   social	   scientists	  are	  
interested	   in	  are	  conscious	  actions	  and	  rational	  decision-­‐making,	   in	  what	  follows	   I	  am	  
treating	  agents	  as	  thinking	  subjects	  and	  do	  not	  consider	  issues	  such	  as	  sense	  of	  agency,	  
feeling	  of	  agency,	   sense	  of	  ownership,	  etc.	   that	   feature	  prominently	   in	   the	  agenda	  of	  
philosophers	   of	   mind	   and	   cognitive	   science.3	  Instead,	   I	   focus	   on	   the	   ways	   in	   which	  
thinking	   occurs	   and	   attempt	   to	   shed	   light	   on	   the	   notion	   of	   agency	   as	   used	   by	   social	  
scientists.	  	  
	  
1.	  There	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  ‘social’	  agency	  	  
As	   explained	   above,	   structure	   refers	   to	   social	   patterns	   and	   arrangements	   that	   are	  
believed	   to	   influence	   or	   constrain	   the	   choices	   of	   individuals	   (via	   socialisation),	   while	  
Agency	   refers	   to	   the	   capacities	   of	   human	   subjects	   to	   act	   independently	   of	   social	  
‘pressures’.	   Given	   the	   aforementioned	   inherent	   contrast	   between	   structure	   and	  
agency,	  it	  seems	  that	  Agency	  is	  in	  a	  sense	  our	  guide	  to	  escape	  structural	  determinism.	  	  
Interestingly,	   and	   as	   mentioned	   above,	   social	   scientists	   do	   talk	   about	   processes	   of	  
internalising	   social	   norms	   and	   principles	   (socialisation).	   Nevertheless,	   social	   scientists	  
most	   often	   assume	   that	   despite	   being	   exposed	   to	   all	   this	   ‘internalised’	   social	  
information,	   agents	   manage	   to	   think	   and	   ultimately	   act	   autonomously.	   Without	  
advocating	  holism,	  I	  argue	  that	  social(-­‐ised)	  agents	  cannot	  act	  independently.	  For	  only	  
behavioural	  patterns	  based	  upon	  thinking	  processes	  could	  count	  as	  (genuine)	  cases	  of	  
action.	   In	   turn,	   thinking	   occurs	   in	   virtue	   of	   activating	   representations	   formed	   during	  
experiences	  with	  our	  socio-­‐physical	  environment.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  thinking	  is	  structured.	  
In	  turn,	  Agency	  is	  structured.	  Let	  me	  elaborate.	  
Even	   though	  we	   often	   get	   an	   impression	   that	   thoughts	   occur	   in	   our	  minds	   freely	   or	  
even	  spontaneously,	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  ‘spontaneous’	  thinking,	  and	  the	  adjacent	  
phenomenology	  is	  rather	  illusionary	  (e.g.	  Christoff	  et.	  al.	  2004	  for	  a	  discussion).	  Here	  is	  
why	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case.	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Assuming	   a	   light-­‐hearted	   reductionism,	   thinking	   –	   a	   necessary	   prerequisite	   for	   any	  
genuine	  “action”	  –	  is	  realised	  by	  neuronal	  systems.	  In	  turn,	  the	  way	  thinking	  processes	  
occur	   is	   highly	   dependent	   on	   the	   weights	   of	   the	   synaptic	   connections	   between	  
neuronal	   groups	   that	   underpin	   or	   ground	   thinking.4 	  In	   this	   sense,	   the	   process	   of	  
internalising	   social	   norms	   (socialisation)	   is	   nothing	   but	   a	   process	   of	   adjusting	   the	  
weights	  of	  the	  synaptic	  connections	  in	  question.	  Inevitably,	  socialisation	  processes,	  and	  
in	  this	  sense	  structure,	  has	  a	  decisive	  impact	  on	  agency.	  
Consequently,	  there	  is	  little	  value	  in	  arguing	  over	  the	  primacy	  of	  structure	  or	  agency	  as	  
the	  main	  determinants	  of	  social	  behaviour,	  since	  agency	  is	  itself	  structured.	  Instead,	  we	  
might	  be	  better	  off	  by	   recasting	   the	  debate	   in	  question	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  debate	  about	  
the	   relation	   between	   structure	   and	   agency.	   The	   above	   argument	   could	   be	   concisely	  
couched	  as	  follows:	  
1.	  	  	  Any	  Agency-­‐related	  claim	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  is	  a	  claim	  about	  wilful	  action.	  
2.	  	  	  Any	  wilful	  action	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  free	  choice.	  
3.	  	  	  Any	  choice	  is	  the	  result	  of	  reasoning.	  
4.	  	  	  Reasoning	  is	  thinking.	  
5.	  	  	  Thinking	  is	  structured.	  
6.	  	  	  If	  thinking	  is	  structured	  (5),	  then	  agency	  is	  itself	  structured.	  
C1.	  The	  Structure	  vs.	  Agency	  debate	  is	  redundant.	  
C2.	   In	   order	   to	   understand	   the	   nature	   of	   social	   behaviour	   one	   should	   first	  
understand	  the	  nature	  of	  agency.	  
	  
Clearly,	  premise	  5	  requires	  further	  elaboration.	  Before	  turning	  to	  do	  that	  though	  let	  me	  
first	   clarify	   a	   number	   of	   potentially	   controversial	   issues	   in	   the	   above	   argument,	   or	  
rather	  syllogism.	  	  
	  
1.1.	  Clarifications	  
The	   first	   thing	   that	   probably	   stands	   out	   as	   potentially	   problematic	   in	   the	   above	  
argument	   is	   that	   not	   all	   thinking	   is	   the	   result	   of	   rational	   processes.	   Consider	   for	  
instance	   cases	   of	   confabulation	   as	   opposed	   to	   reasoning	   during	   decision-­‐making	  
processes.	   For	   instance,	   in	   their	   famous	   study,	   Nisbett	   and	   Wilson	   (1976),	   asked	  
subjects	  in	  a	  bargain	  store	  to	  judge	  which	  one	  of	  four	  nylon-­‐stocking	  pantyhose	  was	  the	  
best	   quality.	   The	   stockings,	   which	   were	   in	   fact	   identical,	   were	   presented	   on	   racks	  
spaced	  equal	  distances	  apart.	  As	  situation	  would	  have	  it,	  the	  position	  of	  the	  stockings	  
had	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  subjects’	  choice.	  In	  fact,	  40%	  of	  the	  subjects	  chose	  the	  far	  
right	  –	  and	  most	  recently	  viewed	  –	  pair.	  When	  asked	  to	  explain	  their	  judgements,	  most	  
of	   the	   subjects	   attributed	   their	   decision	   to	   different	   characteristics	   such	   as	   the	   knit,	  
weave,	   elasticity,	   etc.	   of	   the	   stockings	   that	   they	   chose	   to	   be	   of	   the	   best	   quality.	  
Admittely,	   confabulation	   is	   a	   post-­‐hoc	   analysis	   of	   a	   taken	   decision,	   and	   in	   this	   sense	  
does	   not	   directly	   contribute	   to	   decision-­‐making.	   However,	   it	   does	   play	   a	   great	   role	  
during	   subsequent	   decision-­‐making	   processes	   under	   similar	   conditions,	   i.e.	  whenever	  
                                                            
4	  Perhaps	  a	  useful	  way	  to	  couch	  this	  is	  in	  terms	  of	  classical	  conditioning	  (cf.	  Pavlov,	  1927	  –	  see	  also	  
below).	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the	  agent	  has	  to	  take	  a	  similar	  decision.	  See	  also	  Haidt	  2001;	  Bortolotti	  and	  Cox	  2009	  
amongst	  others	  foranalyses.	  	  
Furthermore,	  Bortolotti	  (2011)	  argues	  that	  not	  all	  reasoning	  lead	  to	  ‘wise’	  actions	  and	  
that	  not	  all	  ‘wise’	  choices	  that	  experts	  make	  are	  the	  result	  of	  reasoning.	  The	  importance	  
of	  reflection	  in	  decision-­‐making	  has	  been	  extensively	  studied	  in	  the	  literature,	  and	  it	  has	  
often	   been	   pointed	   out	   that	   its	   role	   is	   overestimated	   (e.g.	   Dijksterhuis	   &	   van	   Olden	  
2006;	  Wilson	  et.	  al.	  1984).	  
A	  further	  reason	  to	  assume	  that	  thinking	  is	  not	  always	  the	  result	  of	  rational	  processes	  
can	   be	   found	   in	   the	   claim	   that	   our	   inferences	   about	   unknown	   features	   of	   the	  
environment	   are	   systematically	   error	   and	   biased	   prone.	   Interestingly,	   our	   inferences	  
are	   not	   based	   on	   laws	   of	   probability	   but	   on	   intuitions	   that	   are	   essentially	   ‘quick	   and	  
dirty’	   heuristics,	   (Kahneman,	   Slovic,	   and	   Tversky,	   1982a;	   Gilovich,	   Griffin,	   and	  
Kahneman,	  2002).	  In	  a	  fairly	  similar	  fashion	  Gigerenzer	  et.	  al.	  (1999)	  and	  Goldstein	  and	  
Gigerenzer	   (2002)	   take	   intuitions	   to	   be	   ‘fast	   and	   frugal’	   heuristics.	   Such	   heuristics	  
provide	   computationally	   cheap	   solutions	   to	   complex	   problems,	   either	   theoretical	   or	  
practical	   for	  which	  we	   cannot	   clearly	   distinguish	  between	   two	  given	   alternatives.	   For	  
instance,	   consider	   the	   question	   whether	   Hamburg	   or	   Liverpool	   has	   the	   larger	  
population.	  According	  to	  Gigerenzer	  subjects	  start	  searching	  for	  a	  cue	  that	  will	  provide	  
them	  with	  a	  reason	  to	  choose	  one	  over	  the	  other.	  Fast	  and	  frugal	  heuristics	  might	  for	  
instance	   include	   a	   ‘always-­‐go-­‐for-­‐the-­‐most-­‐popular-­‐city’	   strategy	   –	   the	   rationale	   is	  
roughly	  that	  bigger	  cities	  are	  often	  more	  popular	  and	  so	  forth.	  For	  others,	  intuitions	  are	  
non-­‐inferential	   forms	   of	   insights	   that	   build	   upon	   previous	   experience,	   (e.g.	   Dreyfus	  
1997;	  Osbeck	  &	  Robinson;	  March	  &	  Simon	  1993).	  
There	   are	   numerous	   studies	   focusing	   on	   the	   role	   of	   intuitions	   in	   decision-­‐making.	   I	  
cannot	  possibly	  do	  justice	  to	  these	  arguments	  here	  but	  the	  main	  point	  is	  that	  conscious	  
reasoning	  is	  not	  our	  only	  guide	  to	  decision-­‐making.	  In	  turn,	  this	  makes	  premise	  one,	  of	  
the	  argument	  I	  put	  forth	  above,	  to	  appear	  questionable.	  For	  different	  about	  the	  role	  of	  
intuitions	   in	   decision-­‐making	   processes,	   see	   amongst	   others	   Dreyfus	   1997;	   March	   &	  
Simon	   1993;	   Osbeck	   &	   Robinson	   2005;	   Pust	   2012;	   van	   Inwagen	   1997;	   Epstein	   1994;	  
Evans	  1989;	  Evans	  &	  Overs	  1996;	  Sloman	  1996;	  Stanovich	  1999;	  Kahneman	  &	  Tversky	  
1982b;	   De	   Neys	   2006;	   Osman	   2013.	   Finally,	   in	   the	   literature	   on	   the	   psychology	   of	  
expertise,	   it	   is	   often	   argued	   that	   experts	  make	   judgments	   through	   intuitions	  without	  
requiring	   conscious	   thoughts	   or	   inferences.	   The	   suggested	   view	   bears	   significant	  
similarities	  to	  the	  suggestion	  that	  previous	  experiences	  contribute	  greatly	  to	  intuitions,	  
(Dreyfus	  and	  Dreyfus,	  1986;	  Hutton	  &	  Klein,	  1999).	  
Despite	   that	   conscious	   reasoning	   is	   not	   our	   only	   guide	   to	   decision-­‐making	   though	  
structural	  features	  still	  influence	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  For	  intuitions,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  
unconscious	   stored	   information	   influencing	   thinking,	   are	   themselves	   the	   output	   of	  
perceptual	   encounters	  with	   our	   sociocultural	   (and	   physical)	   environment	   as	  much	   as	  
reasoning	   is.	   I	   turn	   to	  elaborate	  on	   the	  nature	  of	   reasoning	  next,	  and	   I	   continue	  with	  
the	  role	  of	  unconscious	  stored	  information	  in	  higher	  cognitive	  processes.	  	  
	  
1.2.	  Thinking	  is	  structured	  
 6 
My	   starting	   point	   is	   the	   ubiquitously	   accepted	   claim	   that	   concepts	   are	   the	   building	  
blocks	  of	  thoughts.	  In	  turn,	  concepts	  are	  built	  out	  of	  perceptual	  representations	  formed	  
during	   experiences	   with	   our	   socio-­‐physical	   environment	   and	   stored	   in	   long-­‐term	  
memory.	  I	  only	  briefly	  examine	  concept	  acquisition	  here	  since	  I	  have	  done	  that	  in	  detail	  
elsewhere	  (Tillas,	  2010).	  	  
On	   perception	   of	   a	   given	   object	   a	   representation	   is	   formed	   and	   stored	   in	   long-­‐term	  
memory.	  The	  precise	   locus	   for	  storing	  a	  given	  representation	   is	   influenced,	  and	  often	  
determined	  by	  top-­‐down	  effects	  from	  stored	  representations	  in	  the	  subject’s	  mind.5	  On	  
encounter	  with	  a	  subsequent	  instance	  that	  is	  recognized	  as	  a	  subsequent	  instance	  of	  a	  
given	  kind,	  a	  representation	  is	  formed.	  At	  this	  point,	  a	  scanning	  process	  is	  initiated	  and	  
a	  match	  is	  sought	  for	  in	  the	  subject’s	  memory.	  The	  same	  process	  is	  also	  initiated	  during	  
encounter	   with	   the	   first	   instance	   but	   the	   scan	   does	   not	   yield	   any	   matching	   stored	  
representations.	  	  
The	  scanning	  process	  begins	  with	  highly	  demanding	  similarity	  level,	  which	  drops	  if	  a	  
match	  is	  not	  found	  after	  a	  scan.	  If	  the	  similarity	  level	  drops	  below	  a	  certain	  point	  (after	  
a	  certain	  number	  of	  scans),	  a	  new	  ‘mental	  file’,	  for	  the	  new	  category,	  is	  formed,	  (e.g.	  
Perry,	  2001).	  The	  location	  of	  where	  a	  given	  representation	  will	  be	  stored	  is	  not	  only	  
influenced	  by	  similarities	  with	  existing	  representations	  but	  also	  by	  contextual	  features	  
as	  well	  as	  other	  known	  information	  about	  the	  occurrent	  encounter.	  	  
Once	  a	  match	  between	  the	  currently	  formed	  and	  a	  stored	  representation	  is	  found,	  then	  
the	  existing	  representation	  is	  activated.6	  The	  activation	  of	  this	  representation	  leads	  to	  
two	  things.	  First,	  stored	  representations	  drive	  perception	  in	  a	  top-­‐down	  manner.	  For	  
instance,	  if	  on	  perception	  of	  the	  first	  instance	  of	  a	  tree,	  a	  subject	  has	  formed	  a	  
representation	  of	  the	  tree’s	  trunk,	  and	  a	  match	  with	  a	  stored	  representation	  is	  found,	  
then	  selective	  attention	  will	  be	  driven	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  tree	  parts	  (e.g.	  branches,	  
leaves,	  etc.)	  that	  have	  been	  attended	  during	  the	  encounter	  with	  initial	  instance.	  
Second,	  activation	  of	  matching	  stored	  representations	  leads	  to	  storage	  of	  the	  currently	  
formed	  representation	  at	  the	  same	  locus	  or	  ‘closer’	  to	  stored	  matching	  
representations.	  	  
A	  useful	  way	  to	  construe	  the	  claim	  that	  representations	  are	  stored	  ‘closer’	  together	  
might	  be	  in	  terms	  of	  representations	  with	  stronger	  positive	  memory	  effects	  in	  cognitive	  
tasks.	  This	  hypothesis	  builds	  on	  evidence	  showing	  that	  unlike	  bottom-­‐up	  attention,	  i.e.	  
attention	  captured	  by	  salient	  features,	  top-­‐down	  attention	  enhances	  formation	  of	  
representations	  of	  attended	  features/aspects/information	  e.g.	  Corbetta	  et.	  al.,	  1990;	  
Noudoost	  et.	  al.,	  2010,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  evidence	  showing	  that	  information	  attended	  
through	  top-­‐down	  attention	  will	  later	  on	  be	  relevant	  for	  memory	  formation	  (Uncapher	  
et.	  al.,	  2011)	  or	  later	  remembering	  (Craik	  et.	  al.	  1996).	  
It	  is	  worth	  clarifying	  that	  the	  cognitive	  system	  does	  not	  merely	  rely	  upon	  top-­‐down	  
effects	  of	  stored	  representations	  on	  perceptual	  processes.	  Had	  that	  been	  the	  case,	  the	  
perceptual	  process	  would	  have	  been	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  accidents	  of	  the	  first	  
encounter	  with	  a	  certain	  instance	  and	  miss	  out	  on	  certain	  statistical	  regularities.	  To	  this	  
                                                            
5	  The	  above	  claim	  about	  top-­‐down	  effects	  in	  perception	  is	  similar	  to	  Elman	  &	  McClelland’s	  (1986)	  
‘Model’.	  
6	  See	  Spivey	  and	  Geng,	  2001;	  Chao,	  Haxby	  and	  Martin,	  1999;	  Demarais	  and	  Cohen,	  1997	  for	  evidence	  in	  
support	  of	  this	  claim.	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end,	  top-­‐down	  influences	  have	  to	  be	  construed	  more	  liberally,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  some	  
non-­‐overlapping	  information	  is	  allowed	  as	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	  not	  being	  too	  skewed	  by	  the	  
bias	  of	  the	  first	  encounter.	  On	  encounter	  with	  subsequent	  instances	  of	  a	  given	  kind,	  a	  
similar	  process	  will	  be	  initiated,	  and	  the	  appropriate	  mental-­‐file	  will	  become	  
informationally	  enriched.	  	  
Concepts	   are	   built	   in	   virtue	   of	   an	   abstraction	   process	   selecting	   similarities	   across	  
representations	   formed	   during	   encounters	   with	   instances	   of	   a	   given	   category	   and	  
stored	   in	   a	   given	   folder.	   Crucially,	   similarities	   are	   understood	   here	   in	   terms	   of	  
frequencies	  of	  occurrences	   to	   the	  extent	   that	   the	  more	   frequently	  occurring	   features	  
across	   members	   of	   a	   given	   set	   would	   naturally	   capture	   the	   stronger	   similarities	  
amongst	   them.	   In	   line	   with	   the	   aforementioned	   light-­‐hearted	   reductionist	   view	   and	  
slightly	   paraphrasing	   Hebb,	   the	   more	   frequently	   a	   certain	   feature	   occurs	   across	  
instances	  of	  a	  given	  kind,	   the	  stronger	  the	  connections	  between	  neurons	  that	  ground	  
perception	   of	   that	   feature	   will	   grow.	   What	   is	   key	   is	   that	   concepts	   are	   built	   out	   of	  
representations	   carried	   by	   stronger	   connections,	   i.e.	   representations	   of	  
features/properties	  that	  most,	  if	  not	  all,	  members	  of	  a	  given	  category	  bear.	  
A	  key	  characteristic	  of	  concepts	  for	  present	  purposes	  is	  	  	  that	  	  	  they	  	  	  are	  associationistic	  
in	   their	   causal	   patterns.	   That	   is,	   every	   concept	   is	   associated	  with	  other	   concepts	   and	  
once	   activated,	   the	   concepts	   associated	   to	   it	   become	   sub-­‐activated	   or	   primed	   (see	  
below).	  Here,	   I	   appeal	   to	   the	  widely	  accepted	  Hebbian	   rule	  of	   learning	   (Hebb,	  1949).	  
Briefly,	  Hebbian	  learning	  concerns	  the	  strengthening	  of	  connections	  between	  different	  
neuronal	  groups	  in	  light	  of	  frequent	  co-­‐activation	  of	  the	  neuronal	  groups	  in	  question	  –	  
‘neurons	  that	  fire	  together,	  wire	  together’.	  	  
A	  further	  crucial	  and	  closely	  related	  aspect	  of	  concepts	  is	  that	  they	  have	  rich	  cognitive	  
role	   properties.	  More	   specifically,	   concepts	   are	   endogenously	   controllable	   or	   can	   be	  
activated	   in	  a	   top-­‐down	  manner	  or	   in	   the	  absence	  of	   their	   referents	   (e.g.	  Prinz	  2002;	  
Barsalou	  1999).7	  In	  this	  sense,	  concepts,	  and	   in	  turn	  thoughts	  can	  be	  formed	  not	  only	  
on	  the	  basis	  of	  processes	  of	  perceiving	  but	  also	  of	  processes	  of	  thinking.	  	  
Here,	  I	  assume	  that	  endogenously	  controlled	  thinking	  is	  a	  form	  of	  associative	  thinking,	  
in	  the	  sense	  of	  current	  thinking	  caused	  by	  earlier	  thinking.	  Given	  that	  concepts	  have	  a	  
semantic	  content	  or	  are	  associated	  with	  other	  concepts,	  activation	  of	  a	  given	  concept	  
primes	   other	   associated	   concepts.	   For	   instance,	   consider	   someone	  uttering	   the	  word	  
‘Trip’	  and	  another	  agent	  mistakenly	  hearing	  the	  word	  ‘Grip’,	  who	  may	  resultantly	  start	  
to	  think	  about	  friction	  and	  laws	  of	  physics,	  rather	  than	  travelling.	  This	   is	  a	  case	  where	  
an	  agent	  is	  forming	  a	  thought	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  appropriate	  stimulus,	  seemingly	  in	  a	  
spontaneous	  but	  actually	  in	  an	  associative	  manner.	  
                                                            
7	  Endogenous	  control	  over	  a	  given	  concept	  is	  acquired	  by	  associating	  the	  set	  of	  perceptual	  
representations	  that	  comprises	  the	  concept	  in	  question	  to	  a	  perceptual	  representation	  of	  a	  word	  or	  goal-­‐
directed	  actions	  over	  which	  they	  do	  have	  endogenous	  control.	  The	  claim	  is	  that	  concepts	  inherit	  the	  
endogenous	  control	  that	  we	  have	  over	  utterances	  or	  goal-­‐directed	  actions	  etc.	  In	  more	  detail,	  human	  
agents	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  manipulate	  external	  objects	  in	  relationships	  of	  agency	  towards	  them;	  what	  is	  
argued	  here	  is	  that	  we	  can	  piggyback	  on	  that	  ability	  to	  manipulate	  and	  direct	  our	  own	  thinking.	  In	  this	  
sense,	  human	  subjects	  have	  endogenous	  control	  over	  their	  production	  of	  linguistic	  items,	  to	  the	  extent	  
that	  we	  are	  able	  to	  produce	  linguistic	  utterances	  at	  will	  (or	  silent	  talking	  to	  ourselves).	  It	  is	  this	  executive	  
control	  over	  linguistic	  utterances	  that	  gives	  us	  endogenous	  control	  over	  our	  thoughts.	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Evidence	   in	  support	  of	  the	  suggested	  associationistic	  view	  of	  thinking	  can	  be	  found	  in	  
the	  work	  of	  Elman	  et	  al.	   (1996),	  even	   though	   I	  am	  not	  committing	   to	  a	  connectionist	  
cognitive	   architecture.	   Briefly,	   according	   to	   Elman,	   artificial	   neural	   networks	   can	   be	  
highly	  constrained	  by	  the	  network’s	  current	  weight	  assignment.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  that	  the	  
pattern	  of	  activation	  set	  by	  a	  connectionist	  network	   is	  determined	  by	   the	  weights,	  or	  
strength	   of	   connections	   between	   the	   units.	   These	   weights	   model	   the	   effects	   of	   the	  
synapses	   between	   different	   neurons	   in	   the	   human	   brain.	   So,	   different	   levels	   of	  
activation	  of	  synapses	  that	  connect	  one	  neuron	  to	  another	  place	  a	  significant	  constraint	  
on	  what	  new	   ideas	   the	  mind	  can	  explore	  next.	   In	   this	  sense,	  sub-­‐activation	  of	  certain	  
neuronal	  ensembles	  constrain	  or	  prime	  activation	  in	  a	  specific	  way,	  i.e.	  towards	  specific	  
thoughts	   associated	   with	   the	   sub-­‐activated	   links	   of	   the	   appropriate	   conceptual	   (or	  
linguistic	  in	  many	  cases)	  network.	  These	  sub-­‐activated	  (or	  primed)	  largely	  unconscious	  
connections	  between	  different	   concepts	  are	  what	  we	  phenomenologically	  experience	  
as	   ‘gut	   feelings’	   or	   ‘intuitions’.	   In	   turn,	   unconscious	   cognitive	   processes,	   which	   are	  
projected	   into	   conscious	   cognitive	   processes,	   are	   influenced	   by	   the	   relative	   weights	  
between	  their	  associations.8	  	  
In	   line	   with	   Hebbian	   associationism,	   the	   more	   frequent	   the	   co-­‐occurrence	   between	  
different	  concepts,	   the	  stronger	   the	  connections	  between	  them.	   In	   turn,	   the	  stronger	  
the	   connection	   between	   sets	   of	   concepts,	   the	  more	   frequently	   certain	   sequences	   of	  
thoughts	  will	  become	  tokened	  or	  activated.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  more	  intuitive	  it	  will	  seem	  
to	  us	  that	  a	  certain	  given	  thought	  will	  entail	  (or	  at	  least	  be	  followed	  by)	  a	  certain	  other	  
thought.	  	  
Given	   that	   perceptual	   representations	   are	   essentially	   information	   transmitted	   by	  
activated	  sets	  of	  neurons,	  and	  given	  that	  concepts,	  as	  explained	  above,	  are	  built	  out	  of	  
perceptual	  representations,	  the	  connections	  between	  different	  concepts	  are	  grounded	  
in	   interneural	   synapses.	   In	   the	   light	   of	   Hebbian	   learning,	   the	  more	   frequent	   the	   co-­‐
occurrence	  of	  certain	  concepts,	  the	  stronger	  the	  connections	  between	  their	  underlying	  
neurons.9	  In	  this	  sense,	  thinking	  is	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  the	  associationistic	  patterns	  of	  
concepts,	   i.e.	  by	  the	  associations	  between	  representations	  formed	  during	  experiences	  
with	  our	  socio-­‐physical	  environment,	   that	  ultimately	  comprise	  all	  of	  our	  sociologically	  
interesting	  conceptual	  repertoire.	  	  
On	  these	  grounds,	  even	  though	  a	  rational	  thinker	  could	  still	  in	  principle	  be	  able	  to	  make	  
some	  kinds	  of	  choices,	  thinking	  –	  the	  very	  medium	  of	  making	  any	  choice	  and	  decision-­‐
making	   –	   is	   itself	   structured.	   And	   thinking	   is	   structured	   since	   it	   occurs	   by	   deploying	  
concepts	   that	   are	   built	   out	   of	   representations	   formed	   during	   experiences	   with	   our	  
socio-­‐physical	   environment.	   In	   this	   sense,	   thinking	   is	   moulded	   by	   socialisation	   –	   a	  
process	   that	  precisely	  captures	   these	  repetitive	  situations	   to	  which	  subjects	  are	  more	  
than	   often	   exposed.	   Consider,	   for	   instance,	   the	   case	   of	   gender	   socialisation	   during	  
which	   parents	   handle,	   speak	   to	   and	   dress	   their	   sons	   and	   daughters	   differently.	   (See	  
Oakley,	  1974	  for	  a	  discussion).	  	  
                                                            
8 See	  Tillas	  &	  Trafford	  (under	  review	  A)	  for	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  issues	  related	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  intuitions. 
9	  Alternatively,	  Hebbian	  learnign	  could	  also	  be	  couched	  in	  terms	  of	  Long-­‐Term-­‐Potentiation	  of	  neurons	  
depending	  on	  the	  level	  of	  analysis.	  See	  amongst	  others	  Martinez	  et	  al.	  (2002);	  Glanzman,	  (1995);	  
Hawkins,	  (1997);	  Pascoe	  and	  Kapp,	  (1985),	  etc.	  for	  evidence	  in	  favour	  of	  Long	  Term	  Potentiation	  and	  in	  
turn	  Hebbian	  learning.	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Assuming	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   the	   argument	   that	   thinking	   is	   indeed	   structured,	   there	   is	  
probably	  little	  value	  in	  arguing	  over	  the	  primacy	  of	  agency	  or	  structure	  as	  determinants	  
of	  social	  behaviour.	   	  For	   free	  willing	  agents,	   in	  the	  sense	  that	  social	  scientists	  use	  the	  
term,	  simply	  do	  not	  exist.10	  Thus,	  we	  could	  possibly	  acquire	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  
social	  behaviour	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  structure	  is	   internalised	  and	  how	  it	  
influences	  agency.	  
A	  different	  way	  to	  approach	  the	  issue	  of	  how	  structure	  influences	  thinking	  is	  by	  looking	  
into	   the	   relation	   between	   language	   and	   thinking.	   For	   instance,	   there	   is	   a	   growing	  
consensus	  that	  natural	   language	  plays	  a	  significant	  role	   in	  our	  cognitive	   lives.	  Building	  
upon	  this	  claim	  various	  thinkers	  have	  gone	  on	  to	  suggest	  that	  thinking	  is	  secondary	  to	  
language.	  More	  specifically,	  Davidson	  (1975)	  argues	  that	  thoughts	  are	  only	  attributable	  
to	  creatures	  that	  are	   interpretable.	  For	  Davidson,	  a	  creature	  that	  we	  cannot	   interpret	  
as	  capable	  of	  meaningful	   speech	   is	  a	  creature	   that	  we	  cannot	   interpret	  as	  capable	  of	  
possessing	   contentful	   attitudes.	   Furthermore,	   Brandom	   (1994)	   argues	   that	   thought	  
does	  not	  take	  place	  in	  language	  but	  thought	  can	  only	  be	  attributed	  to	  linguistic	  agents.	  
For	   Brandom,	   thought	   and	   language	   acquire	   content	   through	   their	   mutual	  
interrelations.	   Despite	   this	   mutual	   interrelation	   between	   thought	   and	   language	  
however,	  Brandom	  promotes	  the	  significance	  of	  language	  over	  that	  of	  thought	  since	  he	  
argues	  that	  the	  objectivity	  of	  conceptual	  norms	  derives	  from	  public	   linguistic	  practice.	  
Finally,	  Carruthers	  (1998;	  2005;	  2008)	  argues	  that	  natural	  language	  becomes	  a	  language	  
of	  thought	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  natural	  language	  is	  constitutively	  involved	  in	  thinking	  and	  
inner	  thinking	  occurs	  in	  a	  form	  of	  inner	  speech.	  	  
Even	   though	   not	   everyone	   would	   agree	   with	   the	   aforementioned	   views	   about	   the	  
relation	   between	   language	   and	   thinking,	   e.g.	   I	   have	   argued	   against	   Carruthers	  
elsewhere	  (2010),	  language	  does	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  thinking	  and	  impedes	  reasoning.	  
To	   the	  extent	   that	  natural	   language	   is	  not	   simply	  a	   convention	  but	   rather	  one	  of	   the	  
most	  clear-­‐cut	  cases	  of	  structural	  features,	  and	  given	  its	  influence	  to	  thinking,	  it	  seems	  
plausible	  that	  this	  line	  of	  research	  could	  be	  used	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  claims	  put	  forth	  here	  
about	   the	   nature	   of	   Agency	   and	   the	   implications	   for	   the	   S	   vs	   A	   debate.	   However,	  
pursuing	  this	  line	  of	  argumentation	  further	  extends	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  paper.	  
	  
2.	  Potential	  criticisms	  
2.1.	  Who	  made	  who?	  
In	   the	   previous	   pages,	   I	   have	   suggested	   a	   view	   of	   thinking	   as	   heavily	   influenced	   by	  
structural	   features,	  and	  went	  on	   to	  question	  Agency	  as	  used	  by	   social	   scientists.	  One	  
potential	  criticism	  that	  I	  examine	  here	  is	  the	  following.	  Recall	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  
paper	   that	  despite	  often	  appearing	   as	  natural,	   structure	   is	   actually	   conventional.	   The	  
problem	  then	  is	  that	  if	  structure	  is	  a	  convention,	  and	  there	  are	  no	  agents,	  then	  how	  was	  
structure	  brought	  about?	  
As	  explained	  above,	  concepts	  are	  built	  out	  of	  representations	  formed	  during	  perceptual	  
experiences	  with	  instances	  of	  a	  given	  kind.	  Concept	  acquisition	  starts	  like	  a	  bottom-­‐up	  
                                                            
10	  The	  suggested	  view	  has	  clear	  implications	  for	  the	  freewill	  debate,	  on	  which	  however	  I	  do	  not	  elaborate	  
here.	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process,	   i.e.	   from	   external	   stimuli	   attracting	   the	   agent’s	   attention.	   Later	   on,	   stored	  
representations	   drive	   perception	   in	   a	   top-­‐down	   manner	   allowing	   the	   agent	   to	   form	  
more	  (and	  more	  detailed	  representations)	  of	  instances	  of	  a	  given	  kind.	  What	  is	  crucial	  
here	   is	   that	   concept	   acquisition	   starts	   as	   a	   simple	   process,	   driven	   in	   a	   bottom-­‐up	  
manner,	  and	  continues	  as	  a	  process	  that	  yields	  detailed	  representations	  of	  members	  of	  
given	  category	  in	  virtue	  of	  top-­‐down	  influences.	   In	  this	  sense,	  putting	  together	  simple	  
representations	  yields	  more	  complex	  representations.	  Analogously,	  structure	  comprises	  
of	   simple	   information,	   linguistic	  conventions,	   simple	  actions	   that	  ultimately	   reduce	   to	  
movements	  and	  so	  forth.	  Thus,	  despite	   it	  being	  extremely	  complex	  and	  sophisticated,	  
structure	   and	   structural	   features	   in	   particular	   are	   reducible	   to	   simple	   features	   like	  
movements	   and	   in	   turn	   actions	   of	   co-­‐existing	   agents.	   In	   turn,	   I	   am	   not	   denying	   that	  
there	   are	   free	  willing	   agents	  when	   it	   comes	   to	  operating	   simple	  movements	   or	   goal-­‐
directed	  actions	   such	  as	  hunting,	  or	  drinking	   to	  quench	  one’s	   thirst	   and	   so	   forth.	   For	  
simple	   matters	   we	   can	   and	   do	   act	   upon	   our	   will	   in	   the	   strict	   sense	   of	   the	   term.	  
However,	   and	   as	   far	   as	   sociologically	   interesting	   actions	   are	   concerned,	   we	   cannot	  
escape	  structural	  determinism.	  	  
	  
2.2.	  Structural	  changes	  &	  Agency	  
As	  suggested	  in	  the	  previous	  pages,	  social	  Agents	  are	  ‘structurally	  determined’.	  If	  that	  is	  
the	  case	  how	  do	  changes	  in	  structure	  occur	  (if	  not	  by	  agents)?	  And	  changes	  in	  structure	  
do	  occur;	  for	  instance	  recall	  the	  example	  comparing	  feudal	  and	  capitalist	  societies.	  	  
In	  reply,	  it	  is	  structure	  itself	  that	  allows	  for	  changes	  (in	  the	  structure).	  For	  even	  though	  
all	  agents	  are	  structurally	  determined,	  they	  are	  neither	  equally	  determined	  nor	   in	  the	  
same	   way.	   Furthermore	   there	   is	   not	   a	   one-­‐to-­‐one	   relation	   between	   thoughts-­‐and-­‐
actions.	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  forming	  a	  certain	  thought	  will	  necessarily	  lead	  any	  
agent	  to	  act	   in	  a	  specific	  way.	  For	  as	  explained	  not	  all	  actions	  are	  rational	  and	  even	  if	  
they	   were,	   different	   agents	   have	   different	   agendas,	   goals	   and	   so	   forth.	   And	   each	  
agent’s	  experience	   is	  different	   to	  another’s.	  Even	   if	   they	  do	  share	  a	   smaller	  or	  bigger	  
part	  of	  their	  experiences	  there	  will	  always	  be	  differences	  between	  them.	  And	  it	   is	  not	  
always	   easy,	   or	   even	   possible,	   to	   understand	   –	   let	   alone	   predict	   –	  which	   experience	  
plays	  which	   role	   under	  which	   circumstances.	   Besides,	   different	   agents	   have	   different	  
perceptions,	  conceptions	  and	  interpretations	  of	  others’	  actions	  and	  things	  that	  lead	  to	  
actions	   whose	   results	   yield	   structural	   changes.	   We	   only	   have	   experiences	   and	  
memories	  of	  these	  experiences	  with	  fragmented	  aspects	  of	  a	  dynamic,	  indeterminate,	  
and	   at	   times	   locally	   specific	   structure.	   It	   is	   in	   this	   sense	   that	   structure	   is	   liberally	  
deterministic.	  	  
Furthermore,	   communication,	   which	   is	   the	   sine	   qua	   non	   of	   social	   life,	   is	   most	   often	  
imperfect.	  For	  there	  are	  crucial	  differences	   in	  cognitive	  content	  of	   interlocutors,	  or	  to	  
the	  connections	  between	  different	  concepts	  that	  interlocutors	  might	  deploy	  at	  a	  given	  
point	   to	   form	   and	   communicate	   their	   thoughts.	   All	   that	   is	   required	   for	   successful	  
communication	  is	  a	  partial	  overlap	  between	  the	  cognitive	  contents	  of	  interlocutors	  (see	  
Tillas	  &	  Trafford,	  under	  review	  B,	  for	  a	  detailed	  discussion).	  
Finally,	  as	  explained	   in	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	  paper,	   intuitions	  play	  a	  significant	   role	   in	  
decision-­‐making	   that	   reflect	   differences	   of	   our	   past	   histories,	   agendas,	   targets,	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attention	   allocation,	   and	   so	   forth.	   Crucially,	   all	   of	   these	   differences	   in	   interpreting	  
structural	   features	   contribute	   in	   a	   highly	   complex	   and	   sophisticated	   mode	   of	   social	  
interaction	  that	  ultimately	  yields	  structural	  changes.	  That	  is,	  had	  it	  been	  that	  all	  agents	  
were	  determined	  by	   structure	   in	   the	  very	   same	  way,	  and	   that	  all	   agents	  were	  simple	  
input-­‐output	  behavior	  producing	  machines,	   then	   it	  would	  have	  been	  hard	   to	   imagine	  
how	  structure	  could	  actually	  change.	  However,	  this	   is	  not	  the	  case,	  and	  the	  pluralistic	  
interpretations	   of	   different	   aspects	   of	   structure	   by	   different	   agents	   is	   what	   drives	  
structural	   changes.	   In	   fact	   it	   is	   no	   accident	   that	   more	   changes	   occur	   more	   rapidly	  
nowadays,	  in	  an	  era	  when	  technological	  advances	  allow	  us	  to	  travel	  and	  communicate	  
easier,	  faster	  and	  more	  often	  than	  we	  have	  ever	  been	  able	  to.	  As	  a	  result,	  more	  agents	  
are	  exposed	  to	  different	  structural	  features,	  become	  influenced	  and	  try	  to	  adopt	  these	  
new	  elements	  they	  have	  seen	  elsewhere	  and	  adjust	  it	  to	  their	  own	  sociocultural	  micro-­‐
environment.	  	  
	  
3.	  Offshoots:	  Clear	  implications	  for	  the	  Free	  Will	  debate	  
As	  an	  offshoot	  of	  this	  paper,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  a	  view	  that	  there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  agency	  
has	  clear	   implications	  for	  the	  free	  will	  debate.	   I	  do	  not	  further	  elaborate	  on	  this	   issue	  
here	   as	   I	   do	   that	   elsewhere	   (under	   submission).	   However,	   it	   is	   worth	   clarifying	   that	  
even	   if	   there	   is	   no	   Agency	   in	   the	   strict	   sense	   of	   the	   term,	   compatibilism	   is	   morally	  
important.	   For	   even	   no	   ‘choice’	   in	   the	   strict	   sense	   of	   the	   term	   is	   possible,	   we	   still	  
maintain	  our	  ability	  to	  forecast	  the	  future	  and	  intervene	  to	  prevent	  undesirable	  results	  
(as	  well	   as	   to	  bring	  about	  desirable	  ones).	  Our	  ability	   to	  project	  our	   selves/present/a	  
given	  situation	  to	  the	  future	   is	  our	  key	  to	  a	  “non-­‐totalitarian”	  structural	  determinism,	  
so	  to	  speak.	  
	  
4.	  Conclusions	  
In	   the	  previous	  pages,	   I	   put	   forth	   a	   view	  according	   to	  which	   thinking	   is	   structured.	   If	  
thinking	   is	   indeed	   structured,	   then	   there	   is	   probably	   little	   value	   in	   arguing	   over	   the	  
primacy	  of	  agency	  or	  structure	  as	  the	  main	  determinants	  of	  social	  behavior.	  For	  simply,	  
Agents,	  in	  the	  way	  social	  scientists	  use	  the	  term,	  simply	  do	  not	  exist.	  And	  they	  do	  not	  
exist	   given	   that	   they	   are	   structurally	   saturated	  by	  exposure	   to	   structural	   features.	  As	  
explained,	   these	   structural	   influences	   are	   rather	   liberal	   in	   nature	   yet	   significant	   in	  
critically	   influencing	  social	  behavioral	  patterns.	  Finally,	   I	  have	  argued	  that	   focusing	  on	  
the	  process	  of	  socialization,	  and	   in	  turn	  on	  the	  ways	   in	  which	  structure	   is	   internalized	  
and	  influences	  thinking,	  could	  be	  used	  to	  shed	  light	  onto	  the	  nature	  of	  social	  behavior.	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